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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 13-2626 
____________ 
 
EILEEN SHEIL, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP          
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-12-cv-01390) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. William Ditter 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 17, 2014 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 15, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Eileen Sheil appeals the District Court’s May 20, 2013 decision granting 
defendant Regal Entertainment Group (“Regal”)’s motion for summary judgment.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
and remand the case to the District Court.      
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I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts that are necessary 
to our disposition.  On August 21, 2011, Sheil and her sister, Brigid Smyth, went to see a 
movie at the Regal movie theater, to which they had been many times.  After the movie, 
they entered the ladies’ restroom.  As Sheil entered and approached the sink area, she felt 
her shoe and cane slip out from under her and she fell to the floor.  Sheil did not see what 
caused her to fall, but she believes it was water on the floor, because after she fell there 
was a wet area on the buttocks of her pants about the size of her hand.  At the time of the 
fall, Sheil told Smyth that her pants were wet.  Sheil also testified that when she entered 
the bathroom, there was at least one person at the sink.      
 Regal’s associate manager, Henri Scott, responded to the accident and prepared an 
incident report.  The report indicates that Sheil stated that she fell when her cane hit a 
spot of water on the floor.  Witnesses reported hearing a disposal box fall and then seeing 
Sheil fall.  Sheil was taken to the hospital by ambulance.  The report also indicates that 
there was no water on the floor when Scott inspected the bathroom.  
 Sheil described the bathroom as having a tiled floor with sinks and three bathroom 
stalls on the left side of the room.  Hand dryers were located on the right wall, 
approximately six feet past the sinks.  There was a mat on the floor beneath the hand 
dryers, but no mat in front of the sinks.  There was no wet floor sign in the bathroom.  On 
prior visits to the Regal movie theater, both sisters had used the theater’s bathrooms and 
observed drips of water on the floor, although neither reported ever having fallen because 
of the water on the floor prior to the incident at issue. 
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 Scott testified that the bathrooms were generally busiest when movies were letting 
in and out.  He stated that he was aware that water would splash on the floor from the 
sink from time to time.  Scott also testified that Regal’s inspection policy requires that 
each bathroom be inspected each half hour, and he did not know when the bathroom had 
been last inspected prior to this incident.  Robert Mayberry, another Regal associate 
manager, testified, consistent with Scott’s testimony, that water from people washing 
their hands would get on the floor from time to time, and that when this occurred, he 
would see droplets of water the size of quarters on the floor by the sinks.  Mayberry also 
testified that every time he checked the sink area he would see droplets of water on the 
floor.     
 On February 17, 2012, Sheil filed suit in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 
against Regal seeking damages for injuries arising from her fall.  She alleged that Regal 
had a duty to maintain the restroom in a reasonably safe condition and negligently failed 
to do so.  Regal removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on March 19, 2012.  On November 2, 2012, Regal moved for summary 
judgment on Ms. Sheil’s claim.  The District Court granted Regal’s motion on May 20, 
2013.  The District Court found that Sheil had adduced sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she fell because of water on the floor,
1
 but 
also found that she failed to produce any evidence demonstrating that Regal had actual or 
constructive notice of the water on the floor, and therefore concluded, as a matter of law, 
that Regal was not negligent.  Ms. Sheil timely appealed that decision, arguing that the 
                                              
1
 Neither party challenges this finding.   
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District Court erred in failing to infer actual notice from the fact that water on the floor in 
front of the sinks was a frequent occurrence.        
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,  and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 “We review the District Court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion de 
novo, applying the same standard as the District Court.”  Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 
169, 174 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  The District Court “shall grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute 
or issue “is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable 
jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might 
affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 
F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  We will view the record in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  Id.   
III. 
 There is no dispute that Pennsylvania law governs plaintiff’s claims.  In 
Pennsylvania, the “mere fact that an accident occurred does not give rise to an inference 
that the injured person was the victim of negligence.”  Swift v. Ne. Hosp. of Phila., 690 
A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must 
prove “four elements:  (1) a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual 
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damages.” Id.  Under § 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which in Pennsylvania 
defines the duty that a possessor of property owes to a business invitee,
2
 a store owner is 
liable only for injuries to a patron caused by a dangerous condition on the premises if he 
“knows of or reasonably should have known of the condition.”  Id. (quotation omitted). 
Therefore, an “invitee must prove either the [defendant] had a hand in creating the 
harmful condition, or [it] had actual or constructive notice of such condition.”  Id.  A 
business owner has actual notice if he knows of the condition or “the condition is one 
which the owner knows has frequently recurred.”  Moultrey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 
422 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).  To establish constructive notice, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that “the condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise 
of reasonable care the owner should have known of it.”  Id.    
 In the instant case, the District Court granted summary judgment to Regal based 
on its finding that Sheil did not demonstrate that Regal had actual or constructive notice 
of the water on the floor.  The District Court first noted that there was “no allegation that 
Regal caused the water to be on the bathroom floor or that it had actual notice that there 
was water on the floor prior to this incident.”  Appendix (“App.”) 4.  The District Court 
then evaluated Sheil’s claim under a theory of constructive notice, and found that the 
claim failed because “[t]o establish constructive notice in a premises liability case, there 
must be proof that the condition had been present long enough that, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, the defendant would have known of its presence,” and there was no 
evidence here that the spill had been on the floor for a significant duration of time.  Id. at 
                                              
2
 The parties agree that Sheil was a business invitee at the Regal movie theater.   
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5 (citing cases).  The District Court observed that “[i]n the absence of evidence of the 
duration of time a spill remained on the floor prior to an accident, courts have granted 
summary judgment and made clear that constructive notice cannot be inferred,” and 
noted that Sheil “point[ed] to no evidence that could establish when this spill occurred.”  
Id. at 5-6.  The District Court also found that Sheil could not establish constructive notice 
based on Regal’s maintenance policies, because “this evidence d[id] not establish when 
the floor got wet, the trigger which is necessary to start Regal’s duty.”  Id. at 7.  
Accordingly, the District Court granted Regal’s summary judgment motion.  
 The District Court’s analysis regarding constructive notice was correct and 
thorough, and we do not take issue with it.  However, the District Court acknowledged, 
but did not appear to consider, an alternative argument raised by Sheil:  that actual notice 
of the dangerous condition can be inferred from the evidence demonstrating that the 
condition – water on the bathroom floor – occurred frequently.  See id. at 4.  This 
oversight is especially significant because, under Pennsylvania law, “where the condition 
is one which the owner knows has frequently recurred, the jury may properly find that the 
owner had actual notice of the condition, thereby obviating additional proof by the invitee 
that the owner had constructive notice of it.”  Moultrey, 422 A.2d at 596.  Accordingly, if 
Sheil has offered enough evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to actual 
notice, this suffices to allow her claim to go forward, even if she has failed to establish 
constructive notice.        
 In Markman v. Fred P. Bell Stores Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
where a dangerous condition “was not a mere chance occurrence, but so often repeated as 
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to call for frequent notices to the owner . . . we cannot say the jury was not justified in 
finding defendant failed in his legal duty.”  132 A. 178, 180 (Pa. 1926).   In Markman, 
the plaintiff slipped on vegetable refuse and fell while walking out of a grocery store.  Id. 
at 381.  She sued for her injuries and the jury awarded her $3,500.  Id. at 179.  The 
defendant challenged the verdict, arguing that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to 
prove negligence.  Id.  The court rejected this argument, observing that, although the 
“mere presence of [] refuse” at the store exit was insufficient to prove negligence, there 
was testimony that “celery, lettuce, and other plants were washed on the street at the right 
of the door, that parts became loose and accumulated on the pavement and step, and that 
this condition existed at the time of the accident.”  Id. at 180.  The court found that the 
evidence reflected that this condition was so frequent as to call for “frequent notices to 
the owner, and on one occasion to the police, and the same situation was shown to have 
existed when the customer was hurt.”  Id.   Accordingly, it held that it could not disturb 
the jury’s finding that defendant breached his legal duty to keep the premises reasonably 
safe.  Id.  
 Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly applied the analysis employed in Markman to 
infer actual notice from a frequently occurring dangerous condition.  See, e.g., Morris v. 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 A.2d 135, 137-38 (Pa. 1956) (holding that the “owner or 
custodian of a parking lot” received notice “every winter” that the weather might create 
dangerous, icy conditions in the lot, and, therefore, was on actual notice of a possibly 
dangerous condition for its patrons); Miller v. Peter J. Schmitt & Co., Inc., 592 A.2d 
1324, 1333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (Wieand, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that 
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“where the condition is one which the owner knows has frequently recurred, the jury may 
properly find that the owner had actual notice of the condition” (citing cases)).  The 
analysis, however, is not limited to a determination of whether the dangerous condition 
was a frequent occurrence.  Rather, Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff demonstrate 
(1) that the dangerous condition occurred frequently and (2) that plaintiff’s injury was 
caused by the frequently recurring condition.  See, e.g., Martino v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., 213 A.2d 608, 609-10 (Pa. 1965) (no actual notice in a case where a customer 
slipped on a grape and injured herself, because even though there was evidence that 
“grapes had fallen from the counter on numerous occasions,” there was no evidence “as 
to the cause of the presence of the grape in the aisle”); Myers v. Penn Traffic Co., 606 
A.2d 926, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that, although evidence that “filling the 
produce cases makes a mess” indicated that the dangerous condition was a recurring one, 
there was no actual notice, because there was “nothing in the record to indicate that the 
produce cases had been filled near the time that appellant fell”).   
 This framework has consistently been applied to analyze actual notice in 
negligence cases, and the District Court erred in failing to consider it with regard to the 
instant case.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment and remand to the District Court for a determination as to whether Sheil has 
demonstrated actual notice. 
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Regal, and remand the case to the District Court.     
